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Abstract
Background: We investigated the ability of patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) to shift between different self-images.
Methods: We developed an original task (shifting-self task) in which we invited 28 patients with AD and 30 control participants
to generate “who am I” statements that describe 2 alternative self-images (ie, physical-self vs psychological-self). In a
control task, participants had to generate 2 blocks of “who am I” statements (ie, physical-self block and psychological-self block).
Results: Analyses showed longer completion time in both the shifting-self and control task in patients with AD than in control
participants. Completion time on the shifting-self task was longer than that on the control task in patients with AD, suggesting a
shifting cost in AD. Conclusion: We propose that one feature of the diminished sense of self in AD is the difficulty of patients to
shift between different alternating self-images.
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Introduction
Generally speaking, the self can be defined as a set of mental
processes that provide us with feelings of individuality, coher-
ence, and unity that define our uniqueness.1,2 There is a sub-
stantial body of research documenting a diminished sense of
self in Alzheimer’s disease (AD).3 For example, Addis and
Tippett4 assessed the sense of self by asking patients with mild
AD to provide responses to the question “Who am I?” and to
rate personal-self statements (eg, I’m a cheerful person),
family-self statements (eg, “I am a member of a happy
family”), social-self statements (eg, “I’m a friendly person”),
moral-self statements (eg, “I am a decent person”), and
physical-self statements (eg, “I have a healthy body”). The
authors found a weakened sense of self in AD. Similar findings
were observed in a study reporting fewer production of state-
ments describing the self (ie, statements to the question “Who
am I?”) in patients with mild AD than in control participants.5
A diminished sense of self in AD has been also reported by
studies on self-defining memories, which are vivid and emo-
tionally intense memories that help maintain self-consistency
and self-coherence.6-9 A study assessed self-defining memories
by asking patients with mild AD and healthy older adults to
retrieve memories that help explain who they are.10 The study
reported less specific self-defining memories in patients with
AD than in control participants. Another study demonstrated
less production of self-defining memories in patients with mild
AD than in healthy older adults.11 One study has also found that
self-defining memories were less frequently integrated and the
meaning extracted from memories was less frequently tied to
the self in patients with AD than in control participants.12
A diminished sense of self in AD has also been reported in
studies demonstrating that patients with advanced AD are less
likely to recognize themselves in the mirror compared to
patients with mild AD.13-15 In a similar vein, Caddell and
Clare16 suggested that patients with AD do often show
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difficulties with self-recognition, especially in advanced stages
of the disease. A compromised sense of self has also been
reported in research showing the difficulty patients with AD
face in updating their self-knowledge. For instance, Klein et al
(2003)17 investigated the discrepancy between a patient’s rat-
ings of current personality and the relative’s ratings of that
person’s personality now and before the onset of dementia. The
authors found that the patient’s ratings were accurate but
reflected self-knowledge before the onset of disease. Therefore,
self-knowledge in AD may be intact, due to unimpaired seman-
tic knowledge.18-20 A diminished sense of self was also
reported by Ruby et al21 who asked patients with mild AD and
relatives to rate themselves and each other on a list of 40
adjectives and found decreased self-judgment accuracy in
patients with AD.
Although this literature demonstrates a diminished sense of
self in AD, not all aspects of the self are impaired in the disease.
For instance, Baird22 reported a case of a patient who, despite
severe AD, was able to demonstrate preservation of some
aspects of the self. Also, a study has demonstrated that patients
with mild AD can draw on personal memories to maintain a
continuous sense of self or even to reflect on situations in which
they are concerned about their self-continuity.23 In a similar
vein, Strikwerda-Brown et al24 emphasized that, although
memory loss may lead to a diminished sense of self, not all
aspects of the self are impaired in AD. Also, and despite the
diminished sense of self, patients with AD can draw of some
aspect of the self to improve memory function. This issue was
investigated by research on the self-reference effect, that is, the
observation that memory performance is generally higher for
information that is encoded in reference to the self than for
information that is encoded semantically or in reference to
other people. Research on the self-reference effect has demon-
strated that self-reference may improve memory for emotional
information in patients with AD.25,26 Also, patients with mild
AD can draw on their personal and meaningful events to main-
tain a continuous sense of self or even to reflect on situations in
which they are concerned about their self-continuity.27To-
gether, although a diminished sense of self can be observed
in AD, some aspects of the self can be preserved depending
on the stage of the disease and/or individual differences.
The diminished sense of self in AD can be illustrated with
the Autobiographical Memory in Alzheimer’s Disease
(AMAD) model.3 This model attributes the diminished sense
of self to the compromise of autobiographical memory, which
is memory for personal experiences.28,29 The AMAD model
suggests that the compromise of the ability to retrieve specific
autobiographical memories in AD leads to the decontextualiza-
tion of memories and a shift from reliving past events to a
general sense of familiarity, as observed by research demon-
strating a decline in the quality of the recollective experience
for autobiographical memories.30-32 More specifically, the
AMAD model suggests that autobiographical memory decline
in AD limits access to memories that shape self-consciousness,
self-knowledge, and self-images, leading to a diminished sense
of self and identity. Interestingly, and inspired by the work of
Conway,29 the AMAD model proposes the existence of a
“working-self” system. This system refers to an executive sys-
tem that regulates access to self-images and self-knowledge.
According to the AMAD model, the compromise of working-
self in AD, which is related to the compromise of executive
function in the disease,33 leads to a compromised ability to
build a coherent and integrated sense of self in the disease.
According to the AMAD model, the diminished sense of self
in AD can be associated with a dysfunction of the executive
system that constrains and coordinates the generation of self-
images and self-knowledge. The present study contributes to
this executive account by assessing how the compromise of
shifting may lead to a difficulty in generating self-images.
More specifically, we assessed the cost (ie, an increase in reac-
tion time) associated with shifting between several self-images
by asking patients with AD to alternate between the generation
of 2 self-images. To this aim, we designed a simple and original
shifting task to evaluate the costs associated with shifting
between 2 different self-images in AD. In this shifting task,
we invited patients with mild AD and control participants to
generate “who am I” statements that describe 2 alternative self-
images (ie, physical-self vs psychological-self). We hypothe-
size that patients with AD will take longer completion time of
this shifting-self task compared with a control task in which we
invited participants to generate 2 blocks of “who am I” state-
ments, the first block described physical-self and the second
block described psychological-self. To further support the
shifting account, we investigated the relationship between per-
formance on the shifting-self task and performance on a task
that has been widely used to assess general shifting ability (ie,
the plus–minus task). We predicted there will be significant




We recruited 28 participants with a clinical diagnosis of prob-
able mild AD (see Table 1 for demographic information) and
30 older adult controls. The patients with AD were recruited
from local retirement homes, and the diagnosis (ie, probable
AD) was made by an experienced neurologist or geriatrician
according to the criteria developed by the National Institute on
Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association for probable AD.34 The
control participants were mostly spouses or companions of
patients with AD, who were independent and living at home.
These participants were matched with the patients with AD
according to age, t(56) ¼ 0.23, P ¼ .82, sex, w2 (1, N ¼ 58)
¼ 0.08, P ¼ .77, and educational level, t(56) ¼ 1.62, P ¼ .11.
The exclusion criteria for all participants were significant
neurological or psychiatric illness and alcohol or drug abuse.
None of our participants presented any major visual or auditory
acuity difficulties that could prevent assessment. They freely
consented to participate and were able to withdraw whenever
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they wished. Cognitive characteristics and scores of all parti-
cipants are described below as shown in Table 1.
Cognitive Characteristics
Clinical characteristics of all participants were evaluated with
tests of general cognitive functioning, episodic memory, work-
ing memory, shifting, and depression. Scores are summarized
in Table 1.
General Cognitive Functioning
General cognitive functioning was evaluated with the Mini-
Mental State Examination35 and the maximum score was 30
points. Lower general cognitive functioning was observed in
patients with AD than in control participants, t(56) ¼ 18.42,
P < .001.
Episodic memory. Episodic memory was evaluated with a French
version36 of the episodic task of Grober and Buschke37 in
which participants had to retain 16 words, each describing an
item belonging to a different semantic category. Immediate
cued recall was succeeded by a distraction phase during which
participants had to count backward from 374 in 20 seconds.
This distraction phase was succeeded by 2 minutes of free
recall and the score from this phase provided a measure of
episodic recall (16 points maximum). Lower episodic memory
was observed in patients with AD than in control participants,
t(56) ¼ 6.95, P < .001.
Working memory. Working memory was evaluated with the digit
span tasks. Participants were asked to repeat a string of single
digits in the same order (ie, forward spans) or in reverse order
(ie, backward spans). Scores referred to the number of correctly
repeated digits. Lower scores were observed in patients with
AD than in control participants on the forward, t(56) ¼ 2.81,
P ¼ .007, and backward spans, t(56) ¼ 5.84, P < .001.
Shifting. Following the model of Miyake et al,38 flexibility was
evaluated with the plus–minus task. This task included 3 lists,
each containing 20 numbers. On list 1, participants had to add 1
to each number, whereas on list 2 they had to subtract 1 from
each number, and on list 3, to add and subtract 1 alternately.
Participants were instructed to complete the lists quickly and
accurately, and list completion times were measured by a stop-
watch. The score referred to the difference between the time
participants needed to complete list 3 and the average time that
participants needed to complete lists 1 and 2 (the higher the
score, the lower the shifting). Longer completion time was
observed in patients with AD than in control participants,
t(56) ¼ 4.99, P < .001.
Depression. We used the Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale39 which consists of 7 items that were scored by partici-
pants on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not present) to 3
(considerable). The cutoff for definite depression was set at
>10/21 points.40 Needless to say that participants with score
above the cutoff were excluded. Higher scores were observed
in patients with AD than in control participants, t(56) ¼ 3.79,
P < .001.
Procedures
Participants were invited to produce 10 verbal statements to the
question “Who am I?”; half of the statements describe
physical-self and the other half psychological-self. More spe-
cifically, following Addis and Tippett,4 we invited participants
to provide very short statements, beginning with the phrase “I
am,” that they felt were essential to defining who they are. We
explained that responses should reflect stable and enduring
aspects of identity, and these aspects should reflect, respec-
tively, physical or personality traits. Following Charlesworth
et al,41 we explained that physical-self statements should
reflect attributes that were apparent from appearance (eg, beau-
tiful, small, sick), and psychological statements should reflect a
personality trait (eg, confident, honest) or an emotional state
(eg, happy, calm, sad). Note that only 10 statements were
assessed because a previous study has demonstrated limited
production of “who am I” statements in mild AD.5
Table 1. Demographic and Cognitive Characteristics of Patients With AD and Older Adults.a
Task AD (n ¼ 28) Older Adults (n ¼ 30)
Women/men 20/8 21/9
Age in years 72.82 (6.59) 72.97 (7.83)
Education in years 8.64 (2.57) 9.83 (3.03)
General cognitive functioning MMSE 21.82 (1.47) 28.47 (1.28)
Episodic memory Grober and Buschke 5.79 (2.28) 9.79 (2.35)
Working memory Forward span 5.36 (1.28) 6.50 (1.76)
Backward span 3.50 (1.23) 5.53 (1.41)
Shifting Plus–Minus 11.93 (5.82) 5.83 (3.19)
Depression HADS 7.04 (2.15) 4.47 (2.92)
Abbreviations: AD, Alzheimer’s disease; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination.
aStandard deviations are given in parentheses; the maximum score on the MMSE is 30 points; performance on the Grober and Buschkle task referred to free recall
and the maximum score is 16 points; performance on the forward and backward spans was the number of correctly repeated digits; scores on the Plus–Minus
task referred to completion time; the cutoff on the HADS was >10/21 points.
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The main experimental feature of our study was the follow-
ing: Participants were invited to shift between the production of
statements describing physical- and psychological-self. The
order or the 2 categories (physical- and psychological-self)
were randomized across participants. The participants were
provided with 2 examples of shifting, each example depicting
in different color a statement describing physical-self (ie, “I am
tall” printed in blue) and another one describing psychological-
self (ie, “I am friendly” printed in red). These examples were
printed on a white A4 sheet of paper. To ensure that partici-
pants understood the requirements of the task, they were asked
to repeat the instructions using their own words. Further expla-
nations were provided if necessary to ensure complete compre-
hension. Prior to testing, participants were instructed to
complete the task quickly, and completion times (in seconds)
were measured by a stopwatch. Performance referred to the
completion time of the task; the higher the score, the lower the
shifting. Note that our task was based on that used by Rathbone
and Moulin42 who used a switching task in which young parti-
cipants (generally undergraduates) retrieved memories cued by
alternated self-image cues or the same cue repeatedly. However,
in our study, participants were not invited to retrieve memories
but only to alternate between physical- and psychological-self.
The procedures of the shifting-self task were replicated in a
control task. The only difference was that in the control task,
participants were invited to generate 2 blocks of “who am I”
statements. The first block consisted of 5 statements
describing physical-self and the second block consisted of 5
statements describing psychological-self. The 2 blocks were
counterbalanced across the participants. We also counterba-
lanced the order in which participants performed the shifting-
self and control tasks; the 2 tasks were separated by the
cognitive examination.
Results
To test our first hypothesis (ie, our expectation that patients
with AD will take longer completion time of this shifting-self
task compared with a control task), we compared the perfor-
mance of patients with AD and control participants on the
shifting-self and controls tasks. Performance was compared
with a repeated measure analysis of variance with group
(patients with AD vs control participants) as the between-
participants factor and condition (shifting-self vs control task)
as the repeated measure. Note that variables were plotted and
checked for normal distribution with Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests. To test our second hypothesis (ie, our expectation about
significant correlations between performance on the shifting-
self task and the plus–minus task), we analyzed the correlation
between performance on the shifting-self and control tasks and
the plus–minus task in each population with Pearson correla-
tions. We also analyzed differences on the number of “who am
I” statements between patients with AD and control partici-
pants on the shifting-self and control tasks. Performance was
compared with nonparametric tests as the data did not follow a
Gaussian distribution. For all tests, the level of significance was
set as P  .05.
Shifting Costs in AD
Completion time is depicted in Figure 1. Analyses showed a
significant group effect, F(1, 56) ¼ 22.31, P < .001, Z2 ¼ 0.58;
longer completion time was observed in patients with AD
(mean [M] ¼ 100.54, standard deviation [SD] ¼ 39.31) than
in control participants (M ¼ 64.47, SD ¼ 21.30). The task
condition effect was also significant, F(1,56) ¼ 33.43,
P < .001, Z2 ¼ 0.37, and longer completion time was observed
on the shifting-self (M ¼ 91.41, SD ¼ 41.17) than on the
control task (M ¼ 72.31, SD ¼ 31.23) in all participants over-
all. The interaction effect between group and condition was
also significant, F(1,56) ¼ 5.23, P ¼ .026, Z2 ¼ 0.08. Inde-
pendent samples t tests demonstrated longer completion time in
patients with AD than in control participants on the self-
shifting task, MAD ¼ 114.07, SD ¼ 44.26, Mcontrols ¼ 70.33,
SD ¼ 23.52, t(56) ¼ 4.74, P < .001, and control task, MAD ¼
87.00, SD ¼ 35.28, Mcontrols ¼ 58.60, SD ¼ 18.86, t(56) ¼
3.86, P < .001. Paired t tests demonstrated longer completion
time on the self-shifting task than on the control test in patients
with AD, t(27) ¼ 6.48, P < .001, and control participants, t(29)
¼ 2.26, P ¼ .031.
Significant Correlations Between Performances on
Shifting-Self and Plus–Minus Tasks in Patients With AD
As illustrated in Figure 2, significant correlations were
observed between performance on the shifting-self task and
plus–minus task in patients with AD (r ¼ 0.56, P ¼ .002,
95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.18-0.75) and control partici-
pants (r ¼ 0.48, P ¼ .007, 95% CI: 0.14-0.72). No significant
correlations were observed between the performance on the
control task and plus–minus task. To investigate any potential
effect of depression, we conducted partial correlations, con-
trolling for depression scores; analysis demonstrated signifi-
























Figure 1. The completion time of the shifting-self and control tasks in
patients with Alzheimer’s disease and control participants. Error bars
are 95% within-subject confidence intervals.
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task and plus–minus task in patients with AD (r ¼ 0.43, P ¼
.014, 95% CI: 0.07-0.59) and control participants (r ¼ 0.41, P
¼ .011, 95% CI: 0.06-0.54); no significant correlations were
observed between the performance on the control task and
plus–minus task.
Few “Who Am I?” Statements in AD
The means of "who am I" statements are provided in Table 2.
We analyzed the number of “who am I?” statements between
patients with AD and control participants on the shifting-self
and control tasks. Similar total number of statements was
observed in patients with AD in the shifting-self (M ¼ 7.74,
SD¼ 2.24) and control task (M¼ 7.03, SD¼ 2.97; Z¼0.68,
P ¼ .49). Similar total number of “who am I?” statements was
observed in control participants in the shifting-self (M ¼ 9.38,
SD¼ 0.31) and control task (M¼ 8.94, SD¼ 1.04; Z¼0.31,
P ¼ .75). Regarding the shifting-self task, fewer total number
of “who am I” statements was produced by patients with AD
than by control participants (Z ¼ 2.46, P ¼ .014). Compared
to control participants, patients with AD produced fewer state-
ments when describing physical-self (Z ¼ 2.62, P ¼ .009)
and psychological-self (Z ¼ 2.51, P ¼ .012). Patients with
AD produced similar “who am I” statements when describing
physical- and psychological-self (Z¼0.29, P¼ .77). Control
participants also produced similar “who am I” statements when
describing physical- and psychological-self (Z ¼ 0.08, P ¼
.94). Regarding the control task, fewer total number of “who
am I” statements were produced by patients with AD than by
control participants (Z ¼ 2.42, P ¼ .015). Compared to con-
trol participants, patients with AD produced fewer statements
when describing physical-self (Z ¼ 2.00, P ¼ .045) and
psychological-self (Z ¼ 2.48, P ¼ .013). Patients with AD
produced similar “who am I” statements when describing
physical-self and psychological-self (Z ¼ 0.18, P ¼ .86).
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Figure 2. Correlations between performances on the shifting-self task and plus–minus task in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (A) and control
participants (B).
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statements when describing physical-self and psychological-
self (Z ¼ 0.20, P ¼ .84).
Discussion
We, for the first time, assessed the cost associated with shifting
between different self-images in AD. Our results demonstrated
longer completion time on the shifting-self and control tasks in
patients with AD than in control participants. Completion time
on the shifting-self task was longer than that on the control task
in patients with AD, suggesting a shifting cost in AD. Interest-
ingly, and unlike performance on the control task, performance
on the shifting-self task was significantly correlated with per-
formance on a typical shifting task (ie, the plus–minus task),
further supporting the shifting account.
The main finding of this study was the longer completion
time of the shifting-self task in patients with AD. This longer
retrieval time can be interpreted in terms of a shifting cost by
which generating alternate self-images leads to a lengthy and
laborious cognitive processing in patients with AD. We attri-
bute this laborious process to the necessity to alternate between
the activation of different self-images. In our task, participants
had to activate a self-image (eg, physical-self) and switch to
another self-image (eg, psychological-self), and so on. Our
assumption reflects basic functioning of shifting, as shifting
typically requires the activation of a new task set and inhibition
of the currently irrelevant task set.43-45 Another explanation of
the shifting costs, as observed in our participants with AD, is
the general executive resources that should be devoted to shift
between different mental representations in the shifting-self
task. Because executive function is compromised in AD,33 this
may explain why our participants with AD had difficulties
performing the shifting-self task.
At the theoretical level, our findings can be interpreted in
light of the AMAD model (which we described in Introduc-
tion). As previously mentioned, this model attributes the dimin-
ished sense of self in AD to a general dysfunction of the
executive system (ie, the working-self system) that constrains
and coordinates the generation of self-knowledge and self-
images. By demonstrating a difficulty to shift between different
self-images, our findings provide empirical support to the
assumption that the sense of self is mediated by an executive
center, as proposed by the AMAD model.
Regardless of the shifting costs, fewer “who am I” state-
ments were produced by patients with AD than by control
participants. This finding mirrors previous research demon-
strating the diminished sense of self in AD.10,11,13,14,16 More
specifically, this finding mirrors the compromised ability to
generate “who am I” statements in AD.4,5 Furthermore, fewer
“who am I” statements were produced by patients with AD than
by control participants when describing physical- and
psychological-self. These findings demonstrate a diminished
ability to produce images related to specific self-dimensions
in AD, which is not surprising as the disease affects the phys-
ical and psychological well-being of patients.
Regarding control participants, our findings mirror those of
a previous study assessing the ability of healthy older adults to
shift between self-images.46 In this study, older and younger
adults were invited to shift between physical-self statements
and psychological-self statements. Results demonstrated slower
completion time on the shifting-self task in older than in younger
adults. The study attributed the slow shift between self-images in
older adults to some self-stability (ie, rigid mental concepts) in
aging. In other words, the tendency of older adults to shift
between self-images more slowly than younger adults might
be because they have more consistent or stable self-concepts and
are therefore less inclined to “change” their self-images.
One limitation of our article may be the lack of assessment
of verbal fluency as performances on the self-shifting and the
control tasks require verbal production. Future research can
include a verbal fluency task to assess whether performances
of patients with AD on the self-shifting task are associated with
decline in verbal fluency.
To summarize, this is the first study to assess shifting between
different self-images in AD. This is also the first study to demon-
strate costs associated with this kind of shifting. We propose that
one feature of the diminished sense of self in AD is the difficulty
of patients to shift between different alternating self-images.
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